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COMMENTS
ALIENS, EMPLOYMENT, AND EQUAL PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The resident alien I traditionally has been accorded many of the pro-
tections guaranteed citizens by the United States Constitution, including
the rights of criminal defendants, 2 the right to "just compensation" for
property "taken" by the government,3 and the right to invoke the writ of
habeas corpus.4 Despite those measures of equal treatment, the non-
citizen has faced substantial legislative restrictions in employment oppor-
tunities,5 due largely to fear of economic competition on the part of
pressure groups of particular trades, businesses, and professions.0 The
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 7 previously was
thought not to be a barrier to such legislation since the states needed only
to justify the discrimination by demonstrating that a "rational basis"
existed for the legislation." Recently, however, the Supreme Court, in
Graham v. Richardson,9 announced that alienage was an inherently suspect
1. The term "resident alien" refers to a non-citizen lawfully residing in the
United States in accordance with procedures established by federal statutes regulating
immigration and naturalization. The statutory language describing such a person is
one "lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1970). See
id. § 12 55(a).
2. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Shinyu Noro v.
United States, 148 F.2d 696, 698 (5th Cir. 1945).
3. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931).
4. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
5. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to comprehensively compile and
describe the many statutes which directly or indirectly restrict alien employment
opportunities. For a general compilation of such statutes, see M. KONVlTZ, THE ALIEN
AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 190-211 (1946) ; Ohira & Stevens, Alien Lawyers
in the United States and Japan - A Comparative Study, 39 WASH. L. REv. 412, 413
(1964) ; Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 CoLum.
L. REv. 1012 (1957).
6. M. KONVITZ, supra note 5, at 172.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The clause provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id. (emphasis added).
8. Equal protection analysis has been divided along two distinct planes. Legisla-
tive classifications considered to be inherently "suspect," such as race, or those distinc-
tions infringing a "fundamental right" can be sustained only after withstanding strict
judicial scrutiny. These classifications must serve a "compelling" or "overriding"
state interest and be necessary to effectuate the states' statutory purpose in order to
withstand equal protection attack. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (fundamental right of interstate travel infringed); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (classification based on race). Statutory distinctions neither in-
herently suspect nor affecting fundamental rights need only have a reasonable or
rational basis to be found constitutional. In these cases, the usual presumption of a
statute's constitutionality applies. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87
(1970). See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065 (1969).
9. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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classification, and hence a discriminatory state law had to be able to pass the
test of strict judicial scrutiny in order to withstand an equal protection
challenge. 10 Then, in the 1973 companion cases Sugarman v. Dougall"
and In re Griffiths,12 the Supreme Court, with broad strokes, brushed
away much of the states' power to condition employment on United
States citizenship.
18
This Comment will consider the evolving position of the alien vis-A-vis
the equal protection clause and will emphasize case law which delineates
the state's power to restrict the alien's right to work. Detailed treatment
will be given to the effect of the alien's new "suspect class" status through
close examination of Dougall and Griffiths. In addition, discrimination by
the federal government and the question of whether any restriction of
federal employment to United States citizens is so unjustified as to be
violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment 14 will be con-
sidered through a discussion of the effect of Graham, Dougall, and Griffiths
upon federal employment standards.
II. EARLY PRECEDENT AND THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST
The common law created no general barrier to the alien's ability to
secure employment.15 However, as the United States underwent rapid
industrialization and shifted from a rural to an urban society, new limita-
tions on employment opportunities gave rise to a policy of preferring
citizen labor.' As a result, numerous statutory limitations on the alien's
right to work were developed. 17 Despite this xenophobic attitude, as far
back as 1886 it was settled that the protections of the fourteenth amend-
ment were not restricted to United States citizens. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,' the Supreme Court decided that the equal protection clause
was of universal application, extending to all persons "within the terri-
torial jurisdiction, without regard to nationality."' 19 The Court, in finding
an ordinance to have been administered in a discriminatory manner against
the alien petitioner, did not expressly state the standard by which an equal
protection violation was to be found, but stated that no reason had been
10. Id. at 371-72. See note 8 supra.
11. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
12. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
13. The Court, in Dougall, invalidated a state statute which placed broad
restrictions on the alien's ability to secure a state civil service position. 413 U.S.
at 646. In Gritflihs, the Court voided a state law which limited admission to the legal
profession to citizens. 413 U.S. at 729. See part IV infra.
14. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
15. See Note, supra note 5, at 1014. The common law only presented no restric-
tions to the employment of "friendly" as opposed to "enemy" aliens. Id. A "friendly"
alien is a citizen or subject of a nation at peace with the United States. Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950).
16. See Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243, 245 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
17. See M. KoNVITZ, supra note 5, at 190-211.
18. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
19. Id. at 369.
[VOL. 19
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advanced to justify the alleged discrimination. 20 Hence, it appeared after
Yick Wo that a classification based upon alienage having a basis in reason
would pass muster under the equal protection clause.
The Court squarely faced the issue of the alien's right to work in
Truax v. Raich,21 a case involving a state statute which dictated that at
least 80 per cent of the employees of any given employer had to be citizens.
While recognizing the state's power to make reasonable legislative classifi-
cations to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, the Court voided
the statute, emphasizing that a state cannot deny its inhabitants "the ordi-
nary means of earning a livelihood. '22 Furthermore, the Court opined that
the "right to work for a living in the common occupations of the com-
munity" struck to the core of the fourteenth amendment.23 Although a
"common occupation" could not be denied to aliens, the Truax majority
expressly approved classifications based upon alienage when the statute
concerned (1) the common property or resources of the people of the
state, (2) the regulation of the public domain (the police power), or (3)
persons employed in public work. 24 Thus, while Truax delineated a seem-
ingly broad area in which the state could not classify on the basis of
alienage, it simultaneously recognized three justifications for state statu-
tory limitations regarding non-citizen employment. These justifications
will be briefly examined.
A. Common Property
At early common law, the sovereign held title to all fish and game and,
consequently, the use of such "common property" was subject to govern-
mental authority and regulation.2 5 In McCready v. Virginia,26 the question
was raised as to whether a state could prohibit citizens of other states from
planting oysters in its tidal waters. Finding that the statute did not con-
flict with Congress' exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, the
Supreme Court recognized that the state owned the beds of its tidewaters
and all the natural resources therein. Hence, the state, in exercising its
20. Id. Yick Wo involved an ordinance which required the licensing of public
launderies operating in wooden buildings. Id. at 357. While the statute did not dis-
criminate on its face, the conviction of the alien petitioner was reversed because the
Court found the ordinance was administered in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 373-74.
21. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id. (citations omitted). While the Court did not define a "common occupa-
tion," it was concerned with the "ordinary private enterprise," within which the state
could provide no good reason for limiting employment to citizens. Id. at 40-41. The
theory on which the Truax Court ultimately rested its opinion is not entirely clear.
Aside from equal protection considerations, the Court noted that denying aliens the
ability to earn a living is equivalent to denying them the right to enter and live in a
particular state because "they cannot live where they cannot work." The statute,
therefore, would also be void as an interference with Congress' exclusive control over
the admission and expulsion of aliens. Id. at 42. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
24. 239 U.S. at 39-40.
25. See Note, supra note 5, at 1014. See also Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,
527 (1896).
26. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
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proprietary rights, could grant to its citizens the exclusive use of its
common property.
27
This reasoning was utilized in Patsone v. Pennsylvania8 wherein the
Court upheld a statute which barred aliens from the possession of rifles
for the purpose of killing any wild game except in defense of person or
property. The Court's opinion is most instructive in its approach to the
petitioner's fourteenth amendment argument. 29 Mr. Justice Holmes, writ-
ing for the majority, began with the premise that a state may make rea-
sonable classifications with reference to the evil which the statute is designed
to prevent.30 The Court then foreclosed any real analysis of the statutory
discrimination and the state's justification therefore by noting that the
issue was one dependent upon practical experience and local conditions.
Hence, the Court opined that it "ought to be very slow to declare that the
state legislature was wrong in its facts."'31 Since the Court admitted that
it had no knowledge of local conditions, it could not help but conclude that
the statute was not unreasonable. 32 Thus the Court appears to have taken
the position that a state's interest in its common property is a per se
rational basis for such legislation. A more complete analysis would have
revealed first, that the statute did not prevent citizens from other states
from hunting and, hence, the common property theory was inapplicable;
and, second, that the statute was not in fact aimed at the preservation of
wild game, for if it were, the legislature certainly would have directed its
prohibitions to a larger group than aliens. 33 Thus, it is apparent that the
statute was aimed at the alien, not at the preservation of the state's
property.34 Once that conclusion is reached, it becomes difficult to support
the position that the statutory classification was reasonable.
Fortunately, the "common property" rationale has been all but nullified
by subsequent Court decisions.35  In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Com-
27. Id. at 396-97.
28. 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
29. Petitioner argued first that the statute deprived him of property without due
process of law, and second, that aliens were being discriminated against as a class in
violation of the equal protection clause. The Court merged the two arguments into
one, stating that if the deprivation of property was justified by the legislative goal
(the protection of wild life), then discriminatory means might also be utilized. Id.
It appears that the Court did not recognize the possibility of the imposition of an
unjustifiable classification notwithstanding the existence of a lawful state objective.
30. Id. at 144.
31. Id.
32. Id. Several state courts reached similar results. Commonwealth v. Hilton,
174 Mass. 29, 54 N.E. 362 (1899) (statute prohibiting aliens' fishing for clams
upheld) ; State v. Kofines, 33 R.I. 211, 80 A. 432 (1911) (statutory restrictions against
alien licenses to fish for lobsters upheld) ; Brownsville Shrimp Co. v. Miller, 207
S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (discriminatory fees for fishing licenses held
valid); Bondi v. Mackay, 87 Vt. 271, 89 A. 228 (1913) (discriminatory fees for
hunting and fishing licenses held valid). But see Begay v. Sawtelle, 53 Ariz. 304,
88 P.2d 999 (1939).
33. See M. KONVITZ, supra note 5, at 215-16.
34. Id.
35. In a case involving discrimination between citizens of different states, the
Supreme Court asserted that the common property theory rested on a legal fiction.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
[VOL. 19
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mission,86 for example, the Court invalidated a California statute which
banned the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to aliens ineligible for
citizenship.37 Among other things, the state had argued on the authority
of McCready and Patsone that it had a "special public interest" in the pro-
tection of its citizens' ownership rights of the fish swimming within the
three-mile limit.38 The Court, while not expressly rejecting that claim,
stated that to whatever extent California "owned" fish within its waters,
that ownership was inadequate to justify the exclusion of lawfully residing
aliens from the chance to earn a living while allowing all others to fish
commercially.8 9 Thus, the "special public interest" in common property, by
itself, does not provide a sufficient rational basis on which to ground dis-
criminatory legislation - at least where the statute involves employment.
40
B. Public Work
Related to the common property theory is the proposition that the
conditions of public work, including what class of persons may be em-
ployed, are also within the state's power to control.4 1 This theory was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Heim v. McCall,4 2 a case in which a
statute restricting eligibility for participation in public work projects to
United States citizens was found not to violate the equal protection clause.
43
Underlying the statute was the state's desire to prevent the pauperization
of its citizens and one means available was the exclusion of aliens from
sharing in the distribution of state tax revenues.4 4 Two general principles
36. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
37. Id. at 420. The Court cited another of its decisions which had sustained
the federal treaty-making power as supreme in the face of the state's claim of
ownership of birds regulated by the treaty, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
In that case, Mr. Justice Holmes, who wrote the Patsone opinion, stated that when
matched against the federal treaty power, "[t]o put the claim of the State upon title
is to lean upon a slender reed." Id. at 434. Hence, the "ownership" theory, while
arguably sufficient to override the alien's right to use natural resources for any reason,
was but a "slender reed" when compared with federal power.
38. 334 U.S. at 421.
39. Id.
40. No opinion is expressed with respect to the validity of the "special public
interest" in common property as a justification for discriminatory legislation outside
the area of employment.
41. See People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 162, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (1915), aff'd,
239 U.S. 195 (1915).
42. 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
43. 239 U.S. at 193. See also Lee v. Lynn, 223 Mass. 109, 111 N.E. 700 (1916);
Cornelius v. Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 213 P. 17 (1923).
44. This was stressed by Judge Cardozo in People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 164,
108 N.E. 427, 430 (1915), which was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the same day
and on the same authority as Heim. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). In
Heim, the Court did not expressly rely upon the state's interest in preventing the
pauperization of its citizens but instead rested its holding on the prior decision of
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903), wherein it had sustained a statute which limited
to eight the number of hours per day an employee of the state could work in its behalf.
In reply to the argument that the Kansas statute denied the alien due process of law,
the Atkin Court had answered: "[Ilt belongs to the State, as the guardian and trustee
for its people, and having control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions upon which
it will permit public work to be done on its behalf .... " Id. at 222-23. The distinc-
tion that the statute at issue in Heim was concerned with who could work and not 5
Coopersmith: Aliens, Employment, and Equal Protection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
emerged: first, that public employment was a "privilege ;"145 and second,
that a state's license to prefer citizens over aliens in the distribution of
state money provided the necessary rational basis for the statutory dis-
crimination.
46
While the McCready-Patsone line of cases had focused upon the state
as property owner, the Heim approach was to view the state as employer.
The Court implied that any time the state acted in its capacity as employer
or disbursed its revenues, sufficient reason existed for limiting the benefits
of governmental action to citizens. 47 Therefore, it appears that by equating
the state with the private employer, the Heim Court created an exception to
the fourteenth amendment's proscription of discriminatory state action: like
the private employer, the state could condition employment on any basis.
48
C. Police Power
Under its general police power, a state may absolutely prohibit occu-
pations which are dangerous or susceptible to abuse.49 A corollary of this
power is that the state also has the ability to reasonably regulate any
aspects of those enterprises. The Supreme Court relied upon this rationale
in Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach5° in upholding a statute which per-
mitted licenses for the operation of pool halls to be issued only to citizens.
The pattern of the Court's analysis was familiar. While reaffirming the
fourteenth amendment's prohibition of "plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens," 51 the Court considered conclusive the state's assertions
that pool rooms were filled with undesirables and were centers of criminal
activity; that non-citizens as a class were less familiar with the laws; and,
merely how long one could work was recognized by the Heim Court, but the public
nature of the work and the state's rights as private employer was deemed controlling.
239 U.S. at 192.
45. Public employment was labelled a "privilege" in People v. Crane, 214 N.Y.
154, 164, 108 N.E. 427, 430, aff'd sub noma. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915),
wherein the criminal sanction of the statute at issue in Heim was upheld.
Historically, a distinction had been drawn between constitutionally protected
rights of citizens and unprotected privileges granted by the government. When
governmental activity was characterized as the bestowing of a privilege upon the
public, any arbitrary aspects of the activity were held to be beyond constitutional
protection. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. Rzv. 1439, 1440 (1968). Thus, in Crane,
Judge Cardozo, although he recognized that an alien had a right to the equal protection
of the laws, by classifying governmental work project employment a privilege found
no fourteenth amendment violation. 214 N.Y. at 164, 108 N.E. at 430.
46. See Note, supra note 5, at 1017.
47. However, when the state hires an independent contractor to work on its
public projects, it cannot dictate the conditions to which the independent contractor
must adhere in his hiring practices. Thus, a New York law prohibiting any contractor
with a municipal corporation to employ aliens on public work projects was held to
violate the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. People v.
Warren, 13 Misc. 615, 34 N.Y.S. 942 (Super. Ct. 1895).
48. On its face this "exception" was not eroded by the Court's decision in Taka-
hashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1968).
49. See Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
50. 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
51. Id. at 396, citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), and Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). (Other citations omitted).
[VOL. 19
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therefore, that maintenance of billiard rooms by aliens was injurious to
the public welfare. 52 As in Patsone, the Court would not balance the equal
protection argument with the police power. It was sufficient that the
legislative aim had a possible rational basis - the occupation was subject
to possible abuse - in order for the statute to be constitutionally valid.5 3
Many states have utilized this rationale to support the exclusion of
aliens from various "private" occupations. The courts sanctioned this
exercise of the police power provided the particular occupation was subject
to some possible abuse,54 but rejected the state's reasoning if the statute
placed limitations on one of the "common occupations." 55 In all cases, the
focus was upon the relationship between the occupation and the state, not
upon the alien and his right to work. 6 The distinction between a "com-
mon" occupation and one "subject to abuse" was far from clear and the
cases reflect little more than the judicial attitude of the particular court
toward alien employment in the particular activity at bar.5 7
In summary, a state legislature could constitutionally restrict alien
employment opportunities whenever it could characterize the state as the
employer or show that the occupation was dangerous or subject to abuse.
In either case, there existed an almost irrebutable presumption that the
statutory discrimination rested on a rational basis.
III. STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
Obviously, the "reasonable relation" test set forth in the Yick Wo,
Heim and Clarke cases - focusing on the right of the state but not on the
alien's right - was wholly inadequate in protecting the right of the alien to
secure employment. Requiring an alien to prove the negative proposition
that a legislative classification was not rational placed a burden upon him
52. 274 U.S. at 397.
53. Id. For an excellent criticism of the Court's analytical approach in Clarke,
see M. KONVITZ, supra note 5, at 177.
54. See, e.g., Tokaji v. State Bd. of Equalization, 20 Cal. App. 2d 612, 67 P.2d
1082 (Ct. App. 1937) (selling of intoxicating liquors); Commonwealth v. Hana, 195
Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907) (peddling); Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149 N.W.
9 (1914) (auctioneering).
55. See, e.g., Templar v. State Bd. of Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 1058
(1902) (barbers); Wormsen v. Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
George v. Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 P. 681 (1925) (sale of softdrinks).
56. In one case, the state court upheld on police power grounds an ordinance
preventing a non-citizen from receiving a license to conduct a pawnbroking business.
Asakura v. Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 210 P. 30 (1922). However, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ordinance encroached upon a treaty between
the United States and Japan providing that citizens of each nation could freely carry
on trade in the other's territory. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1924).
The Court construed pawnbroking to be a trade and concluded that the ordinance
must be subordinated to the treaty despite its recognition of the potential necessity of
such municipal regulation. Id. at 341, 343. But see Tokaji v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 20 Cal. App. 2d 612, 616-17, 67 P.2d 1082, 1084-85 (Ct. App. 1937).
57. For example, in George v. Portland, 114 Ore. 418, 235 P. 681 (1925), the
Oregon Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting aliens from selling and manu-
facturing soft drinks, on the grounds that it violated the fourteenth amendment. One
year prior, however, a New York court had upheld a similar statute because the occu-
pation was deemed "dangerous" as soft drinks can become contaminated. Miller v.
Niagara Falls, 207 App. Div. 798, 202 N.Y.S. 549 (1924).
7
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that was nearly impossible to bear."" However, the state's impenetrable
position against equal protection arguments began to yield after several
notable decisions in which the focus was upon the rights of the individual
alien rather than the state's power.
The seed of the application of the strict scrutiny test to judicial review
of alien discrimination was subtly planted in a footnote to the Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,5 a case in
which the Court upheld, against due process and equal protection argu-
ments, a federal statute regulating the shipment of milk in interstate com-
merce. 0 After stating the presumption of the rationality and constitu-
tionality of legislation affecting commercial transactions, Mr. Justice Stone
opined that the presumption may have less force when a statute affects
specific constitutional prohibitions. In listing several prohibitions, the
Court stated :
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those politi-
cal processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.61
While not expressly mentioning the Carolene Products Co. footnote,
the Court, in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission62 gave further evi-
dence of its willingness to provide "more searching judicial inquiry."
In addition to seriously damaging the common property rationale, Mr.
Justice Black's majority opinion further restricted state power to legislate
against the alien. The state urged that since the federal government could
discriminate on the basis of race and color in exercising its regulatory
power over immigration and naturalization,6 3 the state could condition
eligibility for commercial fishing licenses on grounds of eligibility for
citizenship because, in doing so, it was merely following the national gov-
ernment's lead.6 4 The Court characterized the state's argument as a non
sequitur, stating that the immigration and naturalization of aliens lay with-
in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, and that the states
had no grant of similar power. 65 The Court added: "[T]he power of a
state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is con-
fined within narrow limits."66 Takahashi is thus important not only
58. See M. KONVITZ, supra note 5, at 181.
59. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
60. Id. at 146-47, 154. The statute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (1970), was found to be
constitutional, within the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Id.
61. Id. at 152-53 n.4, citing Nixon v. Herndon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (emphasis
added).
62. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
63. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
64. 334 U.S. at 418.
65. Id. at 419.
66. Id. at 420. It should be noted that the Court could have based its holding
on the rationale of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), finding that the state statute
so affected the alien fisherman's ability to earn a living as to be tantamount to deny-
ing him abode in California. Since federal law is exclusive in this area, the statute
(VOL. 19
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because it clearly affirmed the proposition that federal supremacy over
the regulation of immigration and naturalization restricts the use of those
powers by the state, but also because it underscored, by way of dicta, the
judicial attitude toward state discrimination against aliens.
Both Takahashi and Carolene Products Co. were specifically relied
upon in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State,67 wherein the Supreme Court of
California struck down a provision of the state Labor Code which pro-
hibited alien employment on public work projects. Using as groundwork
the notion that restrictions on employment opportunities limit one's ability
to achieve the economic security "essential for the pursuit of life, liberty
and happiness," 8 the court held that classifications based on alienage are
subject to a strict standard of review. Two general explanations for the
use of the "strict scrutiny test" were offered: (1) alien groups and aliens
have consistently been subject to prejudice, and (2) aliens do not have the
right to vote and thus are denied the most basic means of defending them-
selves.6 9 Hence, any classification, in order to be found constitutional
under the equal protection clause, had to serve a compelling state interest
and be necessary to accomplish that compelling legislative aim. 70 In a
thorough and well-reasoned analysis, the California court did not find
the requisite state interest and the statute was held violative of the four-
teenth amendment. 71
These cases represented significant progress but, as precedent, each
decision was subject to the claim that it was not controlling on questions
of the alien's status under the equal protection clause. The Carolene
Products Co. footnote had been criticized as a poor method of establish-
ing a new constitutional mandate ;72 Takahashi could be distinguished as
involving a classification based not on alienage, but on race ;73 and Purdy,
would be void under the supremacy clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See note 23 supra.
The exclusive federal power over naturalization originates in the Constitution which
grants Congress power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization. U.S. CONST.
art I, § 8, cl. 4. The exclusive congressional power over immigration has its source
in the commerce clause. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
67. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
68. Id. at 579, 456 P.2d at 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 581-85, 456 P.2d at 656-58, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 87-90. The California
Court's analysis is, in many respects, similar to the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
This section of the Comment is primarily concerned with what standard of
review the courts will utilize in assessing an alien's equal protection claim. The next
section will discuss how the strict scrutiny standard has been applied to classifications
based on alienage.
72. Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought a footnote an inappropriate place to put
forth constitutional doctrine. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). It must also be noted that only four members of the
Court joined in the Carolene Products Co. opinion.
73. In 1940, persons of Japanese ancestry were allowed to inhabit the United
States but were ineligible for citizenship under federal law. The California statute
in Takahashi prohibited the issuance of licenses for commercial fishing to any person
ineligible for citizenship. There was evidence that the predecessor California statute
which only banned the issuance of similar licenses to any "alien Japanese," was
amended solely out of fear that it might be held unconstitutional as a racial classifica-
COMMENTS
9
Coopersmith: Aliens, Employment, and Equal Protection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW[
however convincing, was controlling law in only one state. However, all
doubt as to the validity of the position adopted in those cases was dispelled
by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson.74 While the classifica-
tion in Graham did not pertain to alien employment, 75 the Court asserted
that any discrimination against non-citizens was inherently suspect and
thus had to withstand strict judicial scrutiny.7 6 In making this determina-
tion, the Court was quite terse. Mr. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
flatly stated that "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete
and insular minority'" and that more intense judicial review was appro-
priate.77 The attitude of the Graham majority concerning the appropriate
standard of review was quite conclusory, interpreting prior decisions as
having already established alienage as a suspect class. 78 Actually, Graham
was the first Supreme Court case to formally acknowledge alienage as a
suspect class and reverse the presumption of constitutionality of statutory
classifications affecting the non-citizen. At the very least, Graham clarified
what was left implicit in the Carolene Products Co. and Takahashi opinions.
The current law, therefore, requires the state to show affirmatively that
the classification serves a compelling or overriding state interest.79 The
mere rationality of the legislation is no longer sufficient to support its
validity under the equal protection clause.
It is submitted that the imposition of a more demanding standard of
review was a clear step in the proper direction. Since the alien effectively
has been without the franchise since 1928,80 a presumption of the constitu-
tionality of discriminatory legislation would impose severe limitations
upon the alien in his most important forum - the courtroom. 81 Analogiz-
tion. 334 U.S. at 412-13. The Court left unanswered the question of whether the
amendment to the California statute was merely an indirect way to discriminate
against persons of Japanese ancestry, but noted that the Japanese were one of the
few racial groups ineligible for citizenship and that the 1940 census revealed that
Japanese aliens comprised the great majority of ineligible aliens then residing in the
United States. Id. at 412 n.1, 418. Mr. Justice Murphy devoted his entire concurring
opinion to the argument that the amended state statute was a "thin veil used to con-
ceal a purpose being too transparent." Id. at 422, 426 (Murphy, J., concurring). See
also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 650 (1948).
74. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
75. The case involved two statutes: one making citizenship a requirement for
the receipt of welfare benefits and another imposing a residency requirement for aliens
otherwise eligible for similar benefits. Id. at 366.
76. Id. at 371-72.
77. Id. citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938).
78. Id. The statutes in Graham were found unable to withstand the compelling
state interest test and were held violative of the equal protection clause. Id. at 376.
79. 403 U.S. at 376.
80. See Aylesworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 114
(1931).
81. Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that when the legislative processes are freely
accessible, fighting the wisdom of law in the public forum and before the legislature
itself, rather than before the judiciary, "serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a
free people." Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940). This
observation throws into sharp relief the plight of the alien, who cannot bring his
case before the legislature. Hence, the judicial branch must be the protector of the
alien's rights. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd
sub norn. Sinuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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ing to the suspect nature of racial classifications, the condition of alienage,
while subject to change,8 2 is congenital. Thus, classification on that basis
tends to relegate a minority to an inferior social and economic position."
It also appears incongruous as a matter of policy, for Congress to provide
the alien with the right to reside in the United States, only to have the
courts permit the states to erect substantial barriers to the alien's ability to
remain in the country. It would appear that Congress did not contem-
plate that the lawfully admitted alien would be forced to live only in those
states with a "liberal" policy toward alien rights - hence, the supremacy of
federal power underscores equal protection principles affecting all states.
8 4
IV. Dougall AND Griffiths: THE ALIEN AND THE
RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT
No longer satisfied with a showing of a "rational basis" as justification
for a state's limitation of certain benefits and opportunities to citizens, it
was inevitable that the Court should be called upon to provide a serious
analysis of the interplay between the alien, his right to employment, and
the equal protection clause. The Court seized an opportunity to provide
such an analysis in two recent cases in which the state could not show the
requisite compelling interest to justify discrimination against non-citizens.
A. Sugarman v. Dougal85
Appellees, four aliens, sought injunctive and declaratory relief against
the operation of a New York statute8 6 which restricted to citizens perma-
nent positions in the competitive class of that state's civil service scheme. 87
They had resided in the United States an average of almost five years, but
had made no attempt to attain citizenship.88 A three-judge federal court
in the Southern District of New York upheld the appellees' challenge that
the civil service law's discrimination violated the equal protection and
supremacy clauses.89 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute
at issue, in the context of the entire civil service scheme, was too broadly
discriminatory to be supported by the state's substantial interest in limiting
government participation to those who were in "the basic conception of a
82. There are various methods by which the alien can become a naturalized
citizen. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1435 et seq. (1970).
83. See Developments in the Law, supra note 8, at 1126-27; 4 SEToN HALL L.
REv. 210, 219 (1972).
84. See note 23 supra. For a pre-Graham suggestion that alienage should not
be a suspect class, see Note, Protection of Alien Rights Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 1971 DUxE L.J. 583, 595.
85. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
86. N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAW § 53(1) (McKinney 1973).
87. 413 U.S. at 636.
88. 413 U.S. at 637-38. This is somewhat significant to the argument that since
an alien can alter his status, he is not encumbered with an immutable position, that a
classification on that basis is thus not as damaging as a classification based on race, and
that a less severe standard of review might, therefore, be constitutionally permissible.
413 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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political community." 90 Further, the Court found that, standing alone,
the special public interest doctrine espoused in Heim v. McCall9l and
Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach92 was not a compelling interest sufficient
to justify state discrimination against the alien as civil servant.
9 3
The appellant civil service commission argued that a state, when
creating a civil service system, realizes that the civil servant often directly
participates in governmental policy-making and, therefore, must have
undivided loyalty to the state in order to support two fundamental govern-
ment interests: absolute freedom in the exercise of judgment and public
confidence in the objectivity of governmental workers.9 4 Hence, went the
argument, the alien, who may still owe allegiance to his native country,
is a poorer candidate to fulfill the state's needs than is a citizen. In analyz-
ing this claim, the Dougall Court placed the New York statute in its
proper context by considering all the state's statutes and constitutional
provisions pertinent to government employment. 5 This inquiry revealed
that certain classes of civil service employees, including those holding
state executive positions, certain municipal officers, and judicial employees,
were not subject to a citizenship requirement.96 The statute which defined
unclassified civil service - legislative appointee positions, other legislative
employees, and officers surrounding the Governor - also imposed no ban
on aliens.9 7 Yet the statute at issue was applicable to many positions from
the menial to the policy-making. 98 Hence, many appointive and sophisti-
cated jobs seemingly of a policy-making nature were not restricted to citi-
zens while aliens, including the appellees, were excluded from such jobs
as typist, general office worker, and even sanitation men. 99 Applying equal
protection principles, the Court stated: "Our standard of review of statutes
90. 413 U.S. at 642-43. See also Dunn v Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
The state's ability to define its political community was applied to exclude aliens from
participation in the state's political institutions in Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621,
632-34 (1904). The basis of that power was the state's right to establish and operate
its own government and to determine the qualifications of its public office holders.
See Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; id.
amend. X.
91. 239 U.S. 175 (1915). See notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
92. 274 U.S. 392 (1927). See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
93. 413 U.S. at 645. In reaching its conclusion on equal protection principles,
the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the supremacy clause argument. Id. at 646.
94. Id. at 641. See generally United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
95. 413 U.S. at 639-40.
96. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1973).
97. Id. § 35.
98. Id. § 44. This section defines the "competitive class" but it is § 53(1) which
imposes the citizenship requirement. There are also two other classes of civil service
workers. The first is the noncompetitive class which utilizes a noncompetitive
examination. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 42 (McKinney 1973). The other is a class for
positions involving unskilled labor. Id. § 43. There is no alienage exclusion in either
class. Also pertinent to the Dougall Court's consideration of the broad statutory
context of New York's civil service system were several state constitutional provisions
limiting to citizens high elective offices. 413 U.S. at 640. Further, the Court noted
a statute which required any person holding a "civil office" to be a United States
citizen. N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 3 (McKinney 1973).
99. 413 at 643. Of the four instant appellees, two were previously employed by
New York City as clerk-typists, one as an "administrative assistant," and one as a
"human resources technician." Id. at 638.
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that treat aliens differently from citizens requires a greater degree of
precision."'10 0 In concerning itself not only with the state's interest, but
also with the breadth of the statutory discrimination, the Court placed
emphasis on the means the state employed in achieving its goal of having
citizens occupy governmental policy-making roles. While discrimination
against aliens only in policy-making positions would reflect a compelling
state interest, an across the board restriction could not be justified. Find-
ing the discrimination insufficiently tailored to be supported by the appar-
ently legitimate legislative purpose, the Court concluded that the classi-
fication did not withstand strict scrutiny. 101
The Court took a very sensitive approach to alien discrimination. If
the state's interest is not substantial, no analysis of the means taken to
effectuate the state legislative aim will be necessary. 10 2 Moreover, a state's
interest in legislative classification may be substantial; indeed, it may even
approach the level of "compelling," yet the Court will scrutinize the pro-
posed classification to determine if the limitations imposed on the non-
citizen are necessary to achieve the justified result.loa The approach in
Dougall is therefore somewhat analogous to the Court's method of ascer-
taining constitutional infirmities in the area of freedom of speech: even
if the state has a valid reason for suppressing activities connected with
speech, the means taken must be drawn precisely so as not to include any
protected speech within its proscriptions.1
0 4
The appellants in Dougall asserted that not only did the state have an
interest in excluding aliens from policy-making positions, but also that it
had the right to confine all public employment to citizens.' 0 5 Reliance was
placed on the reasoning of Heim v. McCall'0 6 wherein the Court accepted
the "special public interest" doctrine based on the theory that a state, in
distributing its resources, can favor its citizens.' 0 7  Thus, the appellant
argued that this special public interest was a compelling state interest
justifying the discrimination. The Graham Court had answered that argu-
ment by recognizing that such a theory had as its basis the distinction
between right and privilege, a distinction which the Court properly asserted
as having been clearly discredited by a number of cases which had refused
to base constitutional doctrine on the determination of whether a govern-
100. Id. at 642.
101. Id. at 642-43.
102. By way of contrast, under the rational basis approach to discriminatory
legislation, any interest will serve to sustain the statute. Thus, in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971), the Court stated:
[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classi-
fications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reason-
able basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification
is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality.
Id. at 485.
103. 413 U.S. at 642-43.
104. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966). See also Israel,
Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise of the Oath, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 217-19.
105. 413 U.S. at 643.
106. 239 U.S. 175 (1915). See notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
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mental benefit was characterized as a right or privilege. 08 Although the
Graham Court had only opined that the special public interest doctrine
was not applicable in justifying the discriminatory grant of welfare bene-
fits, 109 the Dougall Court did not hesitate to apply Graham's reasoning to
the context of government employment. 110 In both instances, the alien
was being discriminated against in the state's disbursement of its revenues.
Yet, the non-citizen pays taxes, 1 ' is subject to military conscription,
12
and generally bears the same burdens as the citizen. Thus, "he assumes
duties and obligations which do not differ materially from those of native-
born or naturalized citizens." 113
The vitality of the "special public interest" doctrine thus has been
eroded by Takahashi"4 and further weakened by Graham and Dougall.
It would appear clear that aliens no longer can be discriminated against on
the ground that the government may properly prefer its citizens in the dis-
tribution of its resources. 11 Dougall's ultimate conclusion is that, as an
108. 403 U.S. at 374. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court had
before it a state statute which provided that if a claimant for unemployment benefits
would not accept suitable work, he or she would be ineligible for any compensation.
When appellant was considered not to have accepted suitable work because she would
not work on the sabbath day of her faith, the Court held the statute violative of the
first amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion. Id. at 410. The state argued that
unemployment benefits were not the claimant's right, but were merely a privilege. In
rebutting that argument, the Court stated: "It is too late in the day to doubt that...
liberties . . . may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit
or privilege." Id. at 404. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).
The right-privilege distinction was also argued as a justification for exclusion
of alien students from a public scholarship fund. This claim was held violative of the
equal protection clause on the authority of Graham. Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F.2d 577
(3d Cir. 1972).
109. 403 U.S. at 374.
110. 413 U.S. at 645.
111. Id.
112. 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(a) (1970).
113. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. granted,
335 U.S. 857, cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949). In Eisler, an alien attempted to
utilize his lack of citizenship as a bar to a congressional committee's attempt to
subpoena him for testimony. In upholding his contempt conviction for failure to
testify, the court stated:
[A]n alien resident owes a temporary allegiance to the government of the United
States and he assumes duties and obligations which do not differ materially from
those of native-born or naturalized citizens; he is bound to obey all the laws of
the country ....
Id. at 279.
114. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
115. The California Supreme Court, in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d
566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969), in holding that limiting eligibility for par-
ticipation in public work projects to citizens was violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment, recognized that the Heim "special interest doctrine" was no longer viable. The
court noted that aliens contribute to the community and relied heavily upon Takahashi
as confirming new developments in equal protection analysis. Takahashi was inter-
preted (1) to establish a stricter standard of review of classifications based on alienage;
(2) to reject the common property rationale in the natural resources context; and
(3) to imply that employment in the common occupations is a fundamental right.
Id. at 581-85, 456 P.2d at 656-58, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 88-90. If a legislative classification
affects a fundamental right, the court will apply the strict scrutiny test. See note 8
In the civil service context, it could be argued that Dougall recognized that
a non-citizen would not fulfill the state's goals when working in a policy-making
role, 413 U.S. at 642-43, although the Court appears to have foreclosed any state
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alien, lawfully residing in a state, carries the burdens of citizenship, a strict
judicial review of a government's withholding of benefits which would
accrue to a citizen will rarely reveal the now-necessary compelling state
interest for singling out the non-citizen as a class.118
The instant case does not foreclose all limitation on alien employment.
Certainly an individual alien may be excluded from a particular position
or even class of positions on the basis of his alienage if their nature de-
mands a serious relationship to citizenship. 1 7 Surely a state can limit its
political offices to citizens, however, the Dougall Court provided few con-
crete examples of what types of government service demand a relationship
to citizenship. The Court did note that in the civil service area those jobs
which clearly involve policy-making involved "functions that go to the heart
classification restricting alien employment in non-policy-making roles. The Purdy
court stated that alienage bears absolutely no relationship to the ability of those who
work on public projects and that the state asserted no "intrinsic difference between
the alien and the citizen which would render the latLer the more proper subject for
the employment advantages bestowed .... " 71 Cal. 2d at 581, 456 P.2d at 655, 79
Cal. Rptr. at 87.
Thus, the Dougall Court deemed the cases which espoused the "special public
interest doctrine" not controlling in the area of civil service employment, and it would
appear that they have even less vitality in the public works context. The doctrine may
retain some viability in areas where the state's discrimination may be justified on a
rational basis. However, it would appear dead in cases involving alien discrimination
since a suspect class would then be involved, thus requiring the state's justification
to be a compelling state interest. The "special public interest doctrine" has been in-
voked to uphold decisions limiting the non-citizen's ability to inherit and to own real
property. See Blythe v. Hinckly, 180 U.S. 333 (1901); Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923). But see Seii Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). Eventually, the doubtful constitutional
foundation upon which these decisions rest will be recognized as belonging to an era
past. With respect to the ability of the federal government to discriminate against
aliens, see part V infra.
116. 413 U.S. at 645-47. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, opined that the "rational
basis" standard of review is more appropriate when analyzing classifications based on
alienage. He distinguished Takahashi as having involved a racial discrimination, and
criticized Graham as relying too heavily on the Carotene Products Co. footnote
which did not expressly mention alien discrimination. Further, he pointed out, the
alien's "status" can be changed by the affirmative acts provided for by the naturaliza-
tion laws; hence alienage did not deserve the same strict standard of review which the
Court provided in cases involving discrimination based upon race or national origin.
413 U.S. at 657. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Finding it "clear cut" that the state
interest required the competitive class of civil servants to be citizens, Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that as a result of the tremendous expansion of public administration,
many "low level" civil servants had a great deal of policy-making authority. There-
fore, the state's desire for efficient government was reasonably related to the require-
ment of citizenship for government employment, since citizens as a class may be con-
sidered more familiar with the social and political structure of the society. Id. at 661-62.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent reflects the same basic tones worn by Court
decisions of fifty years ago: first, the focus on the state's powers rather than on any
concern for the alien, who like any other person, must work to live; and second, the
insistence that, since an alien can become a naturalized citizen, he must follow the
prescribed procedures before he can become "one of us" and share the benefits that
citizens enjoy.
117. For example, in a non-employment context, a federal district court has held
(after Dougall) that federal and state laws excluding aliens from grand and petit
jury service served a compelling state interest and were thus constitlit;onal. See
Perkins v. Smith. 370 F. Smp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), appeal filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3001
(U.S. Tune 21, 1974) (No. 73-1915). In this situation, the court opined that citizens
as a class are more likely to make informed factual decisions on issues of personal
property and personal liberty due to their greater familiarity with our form of govern-
ment, history, traditions, and political mores. Id.
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of representative government"" 8 and thus could be limited to citizens. It is
the indiscriminate denial of a spectrum of jobs which Dougall prohibits." 9
In the state government service area alone, Dougall will have far-
reaching impact. Presently, at least 17 states have broad statutory restric-
tions on the alien's eligibility to work for the government. 20 Those
restrictions in many ways mirror the blanket proscription imposed by New
York in the instant case. Considering the fact that there are approxi-
mately 9.5 million state and local governmental employees,' 12 the Dougall
decision may be the impetus for opening an enormous number of positions
presently unavailable to the non-citizen.
B. In re Griffiths
122
Appellant, a citizen of The Netherlands, had arrived in the United
States in 1965 and, after graduation from law school, applied to take the
Connecticut bar examination. The state bar examining committee, follow-
ing a court-made rule,12 refused to allow appellant to take the examination
solely on the ground that she was not a United States citizen.' 24 Appellant
sought a decree in the state court that the equal protection and supremacy
clauses dictated that she be permitted to take the bar examination and that
she be declared eligible for bar admission.125 The decree was denied,
and, on appeal the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed. 126 After not-
ing probable jurisdiction, 2 7 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
citizenship requirement, despite the state's substantial interest in assuring
the fitness of its attorneys, 28 did not meet the strict standard of review
118. 413 U.S. at 647.
119. Id.
120. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.05.010 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 89-106 (1971);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 78-1 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 6, § 10 (Smith-Hurd 1966);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1301 (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 365.17(1) (Supp.
1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2939 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 556
(1964); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 12 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43.13 (1970);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 21-31-15 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 19-1806 (1970); N.J. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11:9-2 (Supp. 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 143.16 (1969); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 741.501 (Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-35 (1962); S.D. Com-
PILED LAWS ANN. § 3-1-4 (1967).
121. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POCKET DATA BOOK 95
(1971). Two district court cases prior to Dougall, in rather brief opinions, invalidated
state statutes with broad statutory restrictions against aliens in government employ-
ment. The rationale of both cases was founded upon the equal protection and supremacy
clauses, with strong reliance upon the holdings of Graham and Takahashi. Miranda
v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (D. Ariz. 1972) ; Teitscheid v. Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299
(D. Vt. 1971). It is puzzling that the Dougall opinion never mentioned these cases.
One state case also ignored by the Dougall Court held invalid state restric-
tions on civil service employment of aliens solely on supremacy clause grounds. Hsieh
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wash. 2d 529, 488 P2d 515 (1971).
122. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
123. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK, R. 8(1).
124. 413 U.S. at 718.
125. The decision of the Connecticut Superior Court for New Haven County is
unreported. See In re Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 250, 294 A.2d 281, 282 (1972).
126. Id. at 268, 294 A2d at 289-90.
127. 406 U.S. 966 (1972).
128. 413 U.S. at 722-23.
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applicable to classifications based on alienage and was thus violative of the
fourteenth amendment.
129
The great majority of American jurisdictions specifically require
United States citizenship for admission to the bar. 130 In several states, an
otherwise qualified alien who has formally declared his intention to become
a citizen is eligible for admission' 3' and in only two states is there no
citizenship requirement. 3 2 Early cases decided that the citizenship require-
ment presented no constitutional problems for three reasons: (1) an alien,
owing loyalty to a foreign power, was incapable of taking the oath required
of attorneys ;133 (2) the practice of law is a privilege the state could with-
hold from whom it pleased;134 and (3) an attorney is an officer of the
court and such a power should be given only to citizens.135 While it is
well settled that the states have the power to impose qualifications for bar
admissions, the Supreme Court has noted that these qualifications must be
related to an applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.' 3 6
Recently, several state courts have re-examined the reasoning behind
the exclusion of aliens from legal practice. In Application of Park,13 7 the
Alaska Supreme Court analyzed the relationship between citizenship and
bar admission and concluded that if an otherwise qualified bar applicant
demonstrated the "sincere intention" to become a United States citizen, he
129. Id. at 729.
130. See Ohira & Stevens, supra note 5, at 413-14.
131. Id. at 414 nn.9-11. (Georgia, Massachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma and Ore-
gon). In Massachusetts and Montana, bar admissions will not be granted until the
applicant has in fact become a citizen while in Oregon, admission to the bar will be
voided if the attorney does not become a citizen within six months after he is eligible.
A formal declaration of the intent to become a citizen is merely evidence of
such intent and is not a condition precedent to the filing of the formal petition for
naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1445(4) (1970).
132. See Ohira & Stevens, supra note 5, at 415 n.12 (Tennessee and Virginia).
133. See, e.g., In re Admission to Bar, 61 Neb. 58, 84 N.W. 611 (1900). See
note 139 infra.
134. See, e.g., Agg Large v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 334, 23 P.2d 288 (1933). But see
Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 1058 (1902).
135. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 30 Wash. 234, 70 P. 482 (1902). Speaking gener-
ally to the reasons behind the citizenship requirement for bar admission, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, in a case decided prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, stated:
There is no profession relative to which the public good more imperiously requires
that its members should duly appreciate . . . the genuine spirit of our political
institutions. These are so blended and interwoven with the civil rights of the
citizen . . . that it is difficult to conceive how a professional advocate, owing
foreign allegiance and cherishing alien prejudices, can usefully vindicate principles
in the abhorrence of which he may have been nurtured; how ... the most brilliant
forensic talents can be successfully exerted, unless they are sustained and in-
spired by an ardent patriotism.
Ex parte Thompson, 10 N.C. 355, 363 (1824).
136. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). The Supreme
Court has also decided that the right to practice law is not a "privilege or immunity"
of citizenship within the fourteenth amendment. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
137. 484 P.2d 690 (Alas. 1971). The petitioner in Park had passed the bar
examination but was denied admission to the bar because the applicable Alaska statute
and bar rule required that bar applicants be citizens. Id. at 691. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 8.08.130(a); ALASKA BAR R. II. 17
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could not be denied admission to the bar.'8 8 Considering the state's in-
terest, and the interest of the public in having qualified, competent, and
reliable attorneys, the court found none to be directly served by the re-
quirement that all practicing lawyers be citizens.'8 9 Also rejected by Park
was the assertion that a non-citizen cannot appreciate "the spirit of Ameri-
can institutions" requisite to the practice of law.1 40 The court explicitly
stated that its decision did not in any way depend upon the equal protec-
tion guarantee, simply holding that when an alien sincerely declares his
intention to become a citizen, none of the proposed arguments had a rea-
sonable relation to one's fitness to practice law.1 41 The Supreme Court of
California, in Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners1 42 overruled a
prior decision 148 and found the state's statutory exclusion of aliens from
bar admission violative of the equal protection clause. 44 The court relied
on Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State145 and Graham v. Richardson146 as estab-
lishing a strict standard of review of discrimination based upon alienage
1 47
and rejected the major arguments that had been raised in Park.148 Finding
that the citizenship requirement had no rational connection with the appli-
cant's capacity to practice law, the Raffaelli court concluded a fortiori that
the bar examiners could not meet the burden of establishing that the
classification reflected the compelling state interest required to justify the
discrimination.14
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court was called upon
for the first time, in Grifiths, to test the citizenship requirement for bar
138. 484 P.2d at 695-96. This "sincere intention" is to be distinguished from the
formal filing of a declaration of intention to become a citizen. See note 131 supra.
139. 484 P.2d at 692. The court also rejected the arguments that an alien was in-
capable of taking the oath to support the Constitution, and was not qualified to be an
officer of the court. Id. at 693-95. The court stressed that an applicant who sincerely
intends to become a United States citizen reflects the intent to renounce his loyalty
to his native country and thus may honestly and meaningfully take an oath to support
the Constitution. It noted that an alien serving in the armed forces must take a
similar oath. Id. at 694. As to the "officer of the court" argument, the Park opinion
stated that no case had ever really explained this reason for excluding aliens from
the bar, and it therefore rejected the argument as being devoid of merit. Id. at 695.
140. Id. at 693. Noting that the petitioner had resided in the United States for 14
years, the court opined that this "vague" rationale was valid only to the extent it
reflected the applicant's understanding of the role of law in our system. It was
asserted that the applicant's unfamiliarity could be better determined by testing his
general competence, not by looking at his nationality. Id.
141. Id. at 695. The Park court derived its standard of review for judging the
validity of qualifications for the practice of law from a prior decision in which it had
held that the court will accept legislative standards and rules if they have a "[r]eason-
able tendency to determine whether an applicant has a sufficient knowledge of law
in Alaska . . . ." Application of Brewer, 430 P.2d 150, 152 (Alas. 1967).
142. 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972).
143. Agg Large v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 334, 23 P.2d 288 (1933).
144. 7 Cal. 3d at 304, 496 P.2d at 1275, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
145. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969). See notes 67-71 and
accompanying text supra.
146. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
147. Id. at 292, 496 P.2d at 1267-68, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
148. 7 Cal. 3d at 296-301, 496 P.2d at 1269-73, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 901-05.
149. Id. at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905. See In re Chi-Dooh-Li,
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admission against the equal protection clause. The Court underscored its
analysis, as it did in Graham and Dougall, by emphasizing the various
contributions the alien makes in our society. 150 It was because of these
contributions that the state, in justifying its discrimination against the
alien as a class, had to "bear a heavy burden." Broadly stated, the state's
interest in the instant case was to insure that its attorneys were fit for the
practice of law.151 In attempting to magnify this interest as much as
possible, the appellees in Grifiths initially stressed that a Connecticut
attorney had more authority than do lawyers in other states. 5 2 A Con-
necticut statute labeled the attorney as a "commissioner of the Superior
Court" and vested the lawyer with the authority to "sign writs and sub-
poenas, take recognizances, administer oaths, and take depositions and
acknowledgements of deeds.' 53 The bar examiners also contrasted the
citizen's individual allegiance to the United States with the possibility of
an alien's favoring the interests of his native country. 5 4 Hence, it was
submitted by the government that the alien attorney, considering his
divided loyalty and the greater responsibility provided by Connecticut law,
might be less suited to fulfill his obligation to the courts and his clients. 55
Mr. Justice Powell, author of the majority opinion, found nothing so dis-
tinctive about the Connecticut attorney's powers that would justify bestow-
ing them only to citizens.'5 6 Moreover, no nexus was found between the
citizenship requirement and the ability of an alien to protect the interests
of the national government or his client. 157 It was recognized that in any
situation which presented a conflict of interest, "[a]n honorable person,
whether an alien or not, would decline the representation.' 5 8
Griffiths' underlying premise was similar to that expressed in its
companion case, Dougall. An alien, like any other person, may be unfit
150. 413 U.S. at 722. The Court also expressed its opinion of the alien's place
in our history:
From its inception, our Nation welcomed and drew strength from the immigra-
tion of aliens. Their contributions to the social and economic life of the country
were self-evident, especially during the periods when the demand for human
resources greatly exceeded the native supply. This demand was by no means
limited to the unskilled or the uneducated.
Id. at 719.
151. Id. at 722-23.
152. Id.
153. Id. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 51-85 (1958). Another statute provides that
a Connecticut lawyer, in exercising these powers, may "command" the assistance of
county sheriffs or town constable. Id. § 52-90.
154. 413 U.S. at 724.
155. Id.
156. Id. Moreover, the Court mentioned that these powers did not include matters
of government policy. Id. This is consistent with the Dougall analysis which stated
that aliens could be restricted, as a class, from policy-making positions. See note 117
and accompanying text supra.
157. 413 U.S. at 724. Quite often, attorneys represent foreign countries or persons
from such countries in the United States Courts. In this situation, the Court noted,
the role of the attorney mandates that he further the interests of his client, whether
government or individual, even in the face of a conflicting federal or state interest.
This situation is to be distinguished from the case where an alien practicing in the
United States represents his native country against the United States. The latter
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for the practice of law. However, there exist more precise methods by
which that determination can be made. Every state devises its own stand-
ards for training and expertise in the law, and all bar applicants must
take oaths pertaining to the honest performance of the attorney's function
and the support of the state and federal constitutions. 159 The state is
capable of utilizing these procedures, applicable to citizens, to judge the
alien's fitness' 60 on a case-by-case basis rather than doing so by using a
totally exclusionary rule.' 6 While the Dougall opinion recognized that
aliens as a class might not be suited to policy-making positions, the Griffiths
decision went further, indicating that it has not been established that there
exists any intrinsic distinction between the abiltiy of an alien and a citizen
to function effectively as an attorney.162 In Dougall, government em-
ployment was at issue and therefore governmental interests were more
directly involved; Griffiths, however, concerned mere government licensing
of private employment and, hence, justification for the discrimination was
more difficult. 163
The Court also laid to rest the notion that the attorney, being an
officer of the court, is given actual governmental power which should be
limited to citizens. 16 4 In Cammer v. United States'6 5 the Supreme Court
159. A prior Supreme Court decision affirmed the state's power to investigate,
within first amendment limits, the possibility that an applicant who swears to an oath
might in reality disagree with its spirit. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1970). See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116,
132 (1966).
In the instant case, the commissioner's oath to which all bar association mem-
bers had to subscribe was an oath to support the constitutions of both the United
States and Connecticut "so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof." The Court
opined that since this wording reflected the citizenship requirement, the oath was
unconstitutional to that extent. 413 U.S. at 726 n.17.
160. Id. at 726-27. It must also be noted that there are various methods by which
an attorney can be judged after bar admission. See generally ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RVsSPONSIDhLITv (1970).
161. Id. at 725.
162. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Dougall, was of the opinion that the
citizenship requirement involved more than the state's desire to ensure the technical
proficiencies required for legal practice. Additionally, the attorney, being involved
in the shaping of social relationships and political institutions, should be learned in the
American experience. In Justice Rehnquist's view, that could be accomplished in two
ways: either by being born and maturing in this country, or by the process of naturali-
zation. Therefore, for a state to ensure that attorneys had this experience by ex-
cluding the non-citizen was not irrational. 413 U.S. at 663 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
While the Griffiths majority would probably agree with this analysis, its result is
different due to the fact that it instead applied the strict scrutiny test. Recall that
Justice Rehnquist opined that the rational basis test is the more appropriate standard
of review of the alien's fourteenth amendment rights than the strict scrutiny test.
See note 116 supra.
163. However, it should be noted that Dougall would control in the case of a gov-
ernment attorney since the issue then would be more one of employment than licensing.
164. The appellee took a new approach to this argument by emphasizing that
several constitutional provisions restrict aliens from holding office. See, e.g., U.S.
CoNsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. It was also pointed out that every state denies aliens the
right to vote. The point to be made was that these lawful provisions reflect the
recognition that government participation in the form of office-holding and voting is
an inevitable aspect of citizenship. It is not quite clear precisely how the appellee
arrived at its conclusion, but it argued that the lawyer, being more than an officer of
the court, is actually an office-holder and hence the equal protection clause is totally
inapplicable. Since the Court rejected the claim that the lawyer is an officer-holder,
it reached no decision as to the argument's general merit. 413 U.S. at 728-29 n.21.
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had spoken, at least in the negative, of the lawyer as an "officer of the
court." The attorney was determined to be primarily a private professional
who conducts his own affairs as opposed to the marshalls, bailiffs, court
clerks, and judges who work directly for the judicial system.16° Precisely
what the word "officer" means remains largely unexplained. 167 The
Grifiths Court relied on Cammer and concluded that the mere status of
being licensed to practice law does not place the attorney sufficiently close
to government processes to justify the wholesale exclusion of that license
to the non-citizen.
1 6 8
It is submitted that the Court's realistic approach to the analysis of
the attorney's role is an appropriate one, for it is becoming increasingly
apparent that the attorney serves his client's and his own ends far more
than serving the judicial system or the government. In briefly illuminat-
ing the development of applicable equal protection standards, the Court,
in the instant case, mentioned the alien's right to work in the "common
occupations" of the community, 69 and generally made no distinction be-
tween state restrictions on alien employment in trades, businesses, or
professions. Hence, it was implicit in the Griffiths opinion that to deny
aliens the opportunity to practice law is the equivalent of denying that
class any other common occupation opportunity. However, the basis of
the holding was not that the practice of law was a common occupation, but
that a state could not preclude aliens from such an occupation without
showing a compelling state interest for doing so.
In some respects, Griffiths represents an extreme case. In both Park
and Raffaelli, the bar applicants clearly appeared to have the intention of
becoming citizens.' 70 In Griffiths, the applicant refused to file a sworn
165. 350 U.S. 399 (1956). Carnsner involved a federal statute which granted a
federal court the power to punish as contempt "misbehavior of any of its officers ...."
The issue was whether that statute applied to petitioner, an attorney. Id. at 399-400.
Under Mr. Justice Black's interpretation of the traditional meaning of the characteri-
zation of lawyers as "officers of the court," it was held that the attorney was not
an officer within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 408. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1970).
166. 350 U.S. at 405, cited in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1973).
167. See Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690, 695 (Alas. 1971).
168. 413 U.S. at 729. Mr. Chief Justice Burger labeled the majority's conclusion
on this point a "denigration of the posture and role of a lawyer ...." Id. at 730. He
argued that by being admitted to the bar, the attorney is granted an exclusive license
to exercise the powers commonly associated with the legal profession. It is the court
which, through the state, grants the attorney the power to act as agent for his client;
his obligations to the court, ethical and otherwise, are not the same as those of other
citizens. While the attorney's highest duty is to his client, he must nevertheless
always remain within the law. This dual responsibility to the client and the court, in
Chief Justice Burger's view, is difficult to detect and, since the alien is less apt to
grasp the traditions behind the attorney's "dual role," it is not unreasonable to exclude
the non-citizen. Id. at 730-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
169. 413 U.S. at 720, citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
170. In Park, the petitioner had resided and had been educated in the United
States for at least 14 years. The court did not hold that petitioner had to formally
declare his intention to become a citizen under the immigration and naturalization
laws because the formal declaration of intent did not necessarily reflect what the court
desired - the sincere intention to become a citizen. Referring to the record before it,
the Park court was sure that the petitioner had the requisite intent. 484 P.2d at 696-97.
Raffaelli, which also did not condition its holding on the filing of a formal
declaration of intent, noted that the petitioner "took up residence . . . with the in-
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declaration of intention and expressly stated her desire to remain a citizen
of The Netherlands. 17' Second, the powers accorded attorneys in Con-
necticut were considered insignificant to the Supreme Court's decision in
Griffiths while the Raffaelli court distinguished the Connecticut Supreme
Court's denial of Miss Griffiths' bar application on that very point.1 72 The
Griffiths Court's lack of concern over the factual distinctions from the
Park and Raffaelli decisions indicates its unwillingness to accept any asser-
tion that non-citizens, as a class, are less deserving of admission to the bar
or less capable of fulfilling the attorney's obligations than are citizens.
In answering the narrow question presented, Griffiths effectively in-
validated statutes and court rules of practice in over 35 states.173 Among
the professions, it is submitted that of the attorney, traditionally more
often associated with government office holding and policy-making posi-
tions than any other identifiable group, presents the strongest case for alien
exclusion from government licensing. In the case of the medical profession,
for example, there is no apparent bona fide reason justifying a state's
limitation of licenses for medical practice to citizens, under present equal
protection principles. Likewise, the nature of the teaching profession,
while often raising questions of a constitutional dimension,174 does not
justify a total exclusion of the non-citizen. In either case, the implication
of Griffiths is that the state's power to prescribe qualifications is limited to
qualities of an educational or moral nature.
From Dougall and Griffiths it is clear that the state must now bear
a very heavy burden in order to justify a statutory classification based on
alienage. In the area of government employment, the court will entertain
a functional analysis, judging the ability of the alien to perform the position
from which he is excluded and whether the position involved is of such a
nature that the undivided loyalty of the employee is required. In the case
of governmentally regulated businesses, trades, and professions, the state's
task of showing a compelling interest for its discrimination will be even more
difficult. Unless the vital nexus between citizenship and the employment at
issue can be established, the alien will be treated the same as the citizen.
tention of abandoning his foreign domicile and establishing his permanent home here."
7 Cal. 3d at 291, 496 P.2d at 1266, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
171. 413 U.S. at 718 n.1.
172. 7 Cal. 3d at 303, 494 P.2d at 1274, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
173. See Ohira & Stevens, supra note 5, at 413-14. These commentators' personal
investigations indicated that some states, while having no specific statutory rule requir-
ing that attorneys be citizens, discriminated de facto against aliens. Id. at 414 n.8.
After Griffiths, if these practices are still in effect, it would be appropriate for an
alien denied bar admission to file suit in federal court under statutes prohibiting the
denial of one's constitutional rights. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
174. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See generally Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights
of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKs L.J. 841.
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V. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT
A question expressly left unanswered by the Dougall Court is whether
the federal government can constitutionally impose citizenship require-
ments on those who work in federal service. 175 Current federal statutes
and civil service regulations place broad restrictions on the alien's ability
to secure federal civil service employment.' 7 6 While Dougall foreclosed
the state from broadly limiting the non-citizen's employment opportunities
in state government service, several factors, at least on their face, preclude
the wholesale application of the case to the citizenship requirement for
federal government employment. 177 First, the equal protection clause,
embodied as it is in the fourteenth amendment, is of unique applicability
to the states. Thus, strict judicial scrutiny of alien discrimination may not
be appropriate when judging the constitutional limitations of federal dis-
crimination, which lie within the fifth amendment's due process guar-
antee. 178 Second, since the fifth amendment would be the basis for the
alien's claim, he may be called upon to demonstrate that the discrimination
deprives him of "life, liberty or property."'1 79 Finally, the federal govern-
ment, more specifically the executive branch, has traditionally been accorded
great latitude in determining the qualifications for its personnel1 5s
175. 413 U.S. at 646 n.12.
176. 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970), permits the executive to prescribe regulations to
ascertain the general fitness of civil service applicants. Pursuant to the Civil Service
Act, an executive order delegated to the Civil Service Commission the responsibility
for administering competitive examinations to test the fitness and capacity of appli-
cants for civil service positions. Exec. Order No. 10577, § 2.1(a), 3 C.F.R. 84 (Supp.
1954). Under this order, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a regulation im-
posing citizenship requirements for the competitive civil service. 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (a)
(1972). If an applicant is deemed to owe "permanent allegiance to the United States,"
he may be admitted to take the competitive examination. Id. § 338.101 (b). However,
this phrase has been interpreted to apply only to natives of American Samoa. See
Jalil v. Hampton, 460 F.2d 923, 927 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Another statute excludes
all aliens from the federal payroll except "nationals of those countries allied with the
United States in the current defense effort . . . ." Public Works Appropriation Act
of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-144 § 502, 83 Stat. 336.
177. Most of the decisions denying to the states the power to discriminate against
aliens have relied not only on the equal protection clause but also on Congress' ex-
clusive power to regulate alien activity, i.e., the statutes in issue interfered with
Congress' power and hence violated the supremacy clause. See note 23 supra. Hence,
it has been suggested that when analyzing the constitutional validity of federal dis-
crimination, the alien's use of these cases is less persuasive since it could not be
argued that the government had interfered with a power within its exclusive control.
See Comment, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door? 61 GEo. L.J. 206, 213-15
(1972). However, since Dougall and Griffiths rested solely on equal protection prin-
ciples in limiting the state's power to discriminate with respect to employment, the
fact that an alien challenging federal discrimination could not utilize the supremacy
clause argument is not particularly significant. These two decisions emphasize the
evil in the state statutes was their discriminatory impact rather than their interfer-
ence with exclusive federal power. Neither decision makes mention of the supremacy
clause argument.
178. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Note, supra note 5,
at 1020.
179. See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 Fl2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
180. See Note, supra note 5, at 1020.
COMMENTS
23
Coopersmith: Aliens, Employment, and Equal Protection
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Two circuit courts recently have dealt with this issue in cases which
may portend the end of broad discrimination against aliens by the federal
government in the civil service area.18 1 The first case, Jalil v. Hampton,82
involved resident aliens seeking to overturn the federal regulations which
excluded them from the competitive civil service.183 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss 8 4 and re-
manded for further findings of fact on the issue of whether either the
President or the Civil Service Commission had the statutory authority to
promulgate the regulations at bar. 8 5 Despite the court's refusal to decide
the merits of the constitutional issues, its recognition of developments in
equal protection analysis indicated the direction in which that circuit is
heading. At the time Jalil reached the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court had decided Graham but not Dougall. While the Jalil court acknowl-
edged that the import of Graham's pronouncement on the suspect nature
of alien classifications was confined to the fourteenth amendment, it con-
sidered the decision "quite significant" to an analysis of the limits on dis-
criminatory legislation as set down in the fifth amendment's due process
clause. 186 While the court opined that "the state's power over aliens is
more limited than that of the federal government,"' 8 7 Judge Adams' ma-
jority opinion indicated that it was nonetheless the government's burden to
"demonstrate that its interests justify the discrimination against aliens."'
8 8
Thus, Jalil stands for the proposition that aliens seeking to have discrimi-
natory federal legislation held unconstitutional under the fifth amendment
need not face the difficult task of proving the irrationality of the legislation;
rather it is the government which must justify its classification. Precisely
how this justification is to be made out and what standards must be met,
181. An early case had considered the validity of a federal statute which pro-
hibited alien employment on projects under the Emergency Relief Act of 1938, 15
U.S.C. § 728 (1970), Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Cal. 1939). The court
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and
reasoned that if the state could prefer citizens in paying for public works with public
funds, the federal government could not be prohibited from enacting a similar prefer-
ence. 27 F. Supp. at 244-46.
182. 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
183. Id. See note 176 supra.
184 460 F.2d at 928. The district court's opinion was not reported.
185. Id. at 929. The Jalil court remanded for specific findings as to the number
and types of positions in federal civil service for which citizenship might be a "bona-
fide" qualification, and the availability of any lesser restrictions that would guard the
government's interest. Id. The Court of Appeals also directed the district court to
determine the actual impact of the restrictions on aliens and the number of aliens
who might apply for civil service positions. Id. The purpose of remand was to
create a more complete record by which the court could determine if all or a portion of
government employment is a "common occupation" of this country. Id. at 929-30 n.15.
186. Id. at 929.
187. Id. at 930 n.16. Judge Adams, writing for the Jalil majority, was referring
to Congress' plenary power over immigration and naturalization, impliedly noting
that the three-judge court deciding Dougall had rested its holding on equal protection
and supremacy clause grounds. Since Dougall was affirmed by the Supreme Court
solely on equal protection grounds, it is suggested that Judge Adams' statement will
have little impact on the court considering Jalil on remand.
188. 460 F.2d at 929.
[VOL. 19
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1974], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss4/2
MARCH. 1974]
was left unclear. Judge Bazelon, dissenting in Jalil, opined that, on the
authority of Graham and the district court's decision in Dougall, remand
was unnecessary and improper. He urged that Graham's strict scrutiny
approach to state discrimination on the basis of alienage applied fully to the
federal government, and thus concluded that it was inconceivable that the
government, on remand, could proffer the compelling governmental interest
necessary to justify the exclusion of aliens, as a class, from all competitive
civil service positions.' 8 9
Judge Bazelon's rationale was followed by the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton.190 There, a resident
alien challenged the identical regulation involved in Jalil, and the Mow
Sun Wong court found them unconstitutional as violative of the fifth
amendment's due process clause.' 9' The district court, which granted the
government's motion to dismiss, had heard the case prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Graham. Despite that, the plaintiff aliens had argued
that the classification at issue was subject to the strict scrutiny standard
of review. 192 The district court, however, found the traditional "rational
basis" test more appropriate, asserting that the broad executive power over
aliens militated against a strict judicial inquiry.1 93 In this regard, federal
policy with respect to aliens was deemed to be almost inevitably involved
with areas of executive control, 94 such as foreign relations' 95 and the
war power.' 96 These areas, the court urged, so involved political policy
as to be, at least partially, beyond the limits of judicial review. Further,
it was noted that Congress has broad power over the alien deriving from
the constitutional provision empowering that branch "to establish a Uniform
189. Id. at 930 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Paralleling the Dougall Court's
analysis, Judge Bazelon pointed out that the justification for the total exclusion of
aliens from policy-making positions or jobs involving national security was weak
because in areas of civil service other than the competitive class there are positions
of a similar nature for which there is no alien exclusion. Id. at 930-31. See generally
S C.F.R. § 213.3101-.3394 (Supp. 1973).
It might be argued that the strict judicial approach to state classifications
based on alienage was the motivation for the Dougall Court's analysis of the state's
entire constitutional and statutory scheme in testing the validity of one state civil
service regulation. Logically, then, if a lesser standard of review of federal discrimi-
nation is appropriate, the judiciary might not be compelled to consider the broad
statutory scheme as did Judge Bazelon in Jalil. However, it is submitted that no
court should wear blinders when analyzing a constitutional claim. It would hardly
serve the judiciary's responsibility for aliens' rights, which it holds in such high
esteem when concerning itself with the states' power to discriminate, to ignore the
realities of the entire federal government's civil service organization.
190. __ F.2d __ (9th Cir. 1974) rev'g, 333 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3678 (U.S. June 10, 1974) (No. 73-1596).
191. ____ F.2d at -.
192. 333 F. Supp. at 531. The plaintiffs urged that the stricter standard of review
was appropriate because the classification was inherently suspect or, alternatively,
because it infringed upon a fundamental right. The district court's opinion in Mow
Sun Wong did not specify upon what authority the plaintiffs relied.
193. Id. at 531-32.
194. Id. The cases the court relied on for this proposition all involved the deporta-
tion of aliens and, hence, are arguably distinguishable. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580 (1951) ; Carlson v. London, 342 U.S. 524 (1951); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1949).
195. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
196. See generally Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
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rule of Naturalization. ' 197 Dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, the district
court put forth two bases of rationality for the discriminatory regulations:
(1) the executive's conclusion that policy-making at whatever level should
be entrusted only to the citizen, and (2) the economic security of the
citizen may be enhanced by preferring them over aliens in filling govern-
ment employment positions.1
98
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, analyzing the issues in a fashion
quite similar to the Supreme Court's approach in Dougall. While noting
that Dougall's rationale and holding were not controlling, the Mow Sun
Wong court found them "instructive and significant when applied to the
case at hand."'" It was obvious that the statute struck down in Dougall
and the regulations at issue in Mow Sun Wong were precisely the same in
that both indiscriminately excluded "all aliens from all positions requiring
the competitive civil service examination.
2 0 0
The court decided upon the strict scrutiny test as the appropriate
standard of review under the fifth amendment's limitations on the federal
government's ability to classify on the basis of alienage, 201 although it
never quite made clear precisely how that decision was reached. The
court disposed of the district court's conclusion that Congress' plenary
power over aliens compels the judiciary to apply a rational basis standard
of review of federal legislative classifications, stating that even congres-
sional plenary power has its constitutional limits. 20 2 More specifically,
while Congress has broad power in this area in regulating the flow of
aliens entering and leaving the country, the court noted that once an alien
is legally within the United States, the Constitution limits the govern-
ment's ability to deal with him.20  It is submitted that the Ninth Circuit
properly disposed of this issue. While Congress may freely regulate the
procedures by which an alien may enter this country and those steps neces-
sary for attaining citizenship, it by no means follows that the fifth amend-
ment permits broad legislative discrimination against the non-citizen's
opportunity to secure employment with the federal government.
20 4
197. 333 F. Supp. at 532. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. The district court in
Mow Sun Wong bolstered its argument that the federal government has plenary
power with respect to the regulation of alien conduct by utilizing those cases which
struck down state statutes discriminating against aliens on the ground that they inter-
fered with exclusive federal control over aliens and, hence, violated the supremacy
clause. 333 F. Supp. at 532. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410, 419 (1947). It is ironic that the Takahashi decision, which formed the ground-
work for those decisions striking down alien discriminations, was used against the
alien by the lower court in Mow Sun Wong.
198. 333 F. Supp. at 532-33.
199. .. F.2d at ------
200. Id.
201. Id. at ........
202. Id. at ..... citing United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
203. Id. at .......... n.10(a).
204. It has been repeatedly held that as an aspect of national sovereignty, Congress
has complete control over the terms and conditions upon which aliens may enter this
country, uninhibited by constitutional limitations and judicial intervention. See, e.g.,
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972); Boultilier v. Immigration &
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Although no federal case had squarely confronted the question as to
the standard of review in this context, prior cases provided some authority
for the Mow Sun Wong court. The Supreme Court had stated that while
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to violate due process, the equal
protection guarantee is not necessarily interchangeable with the fifth
amendment's due process clause.20 5 However, in Nielson v. Secretary of
the Treasury,20 6 the same court that decided the Jalil case spoke of the
relationship between the equal protection and due process clauses with
respect to aliens' rights as being one in which:
The courts stand ready to safeguard aliens against unreasonable dis-
criminations, and to invoke the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment as to actions by states, or the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment which provides equivalent standards against
unreasonable action by the Federal Government.
20 7
In this regard, the Nielson court recognized, prior to Graham and Dougall,
that the federal government, like the state, bears the burden of justifying,
by a showing of "special reasonableness," any discrimination against
aliens. 20 8 Utilizing those precedents 209 and Dougall as authority for the
proposition that a compelling state interest is appropriate to test classifica-
tions based on alienage "[i] n the field of public employment,"2 10 the Mow
Sun Wong court concluded that:
A flat prohibition against aliens obtaining employment in the civil serv-
ice is such discriminaton to be a denial of due process unless the govern-
ment can show a compelling interest for maintaining its classification. 211
While the Supreme Court has yet to speak on this issue and Mow
Sun Wong's conclusion is narrowly stated,2 12 it is clear in at least the
Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967); Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). See
generally Gordon, The Alien and the Constitution, 9 CALIF. W.L. Rv. 1, 20 (1972).
205. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
206. 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Nielson involved the question of the consti-
tutional validity of federal regulations which prohibited Cuban refugees from obtaining
their share of assets of a Cuban corporation located in the United States.
207. Id. at 846 (citations omitted).
208. Id. The Nielson court did not explain the meaning of the phrase "special
reasonableness" but it indicated (1) that the burden of proving constitutionality is on
the government, and (2) that something more than the rationality of the measure is
needed to sustain it. Id.
209. The court recognized that the holding in Nielson was distinguishable from
the case at bar but thought the case was relevant "[iun displaying recognition
that the federal government, like a state, must show the reasonableness of and justifi-
cation for any measure discriminating against aliens." -_ F.2d at -_ (emphasis
added). See also Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972); In re Smith,
323 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (D. Colo. 1971).
210. Id. at -...
211. Id. at _ .
212. Id. at _. While Judge Bazelon indicated in Jalil that the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause bars federal government discrimination with the same force
with which the equal protection clause limits state discrimination, 460 F.2d at 930
(Bazelon, J., dissenting), the Mow Sun Wong court expressly rejected that conten-
tion. F.2d at .
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Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit that a showing of more
than mere "rationality" is now necessary to sustain discrimination by the
federal government under the fifth amendment's due process clause. It
is submitted that this is the correct position, for every reason which exists
to place the burden on state governments to justify discrimination against
aliens applies with equal force to the federal government.213
After establishing the standard of review, the Mow Sun Wong court
had little difficulty finding that there existed no compelling interest justify-
ing the exclusion of aliens from competitive federal civil service positions.
In so doing, the court rejected most of the same arguments which had been
raised by the state in Dougall. First, as to the lower court's assertion that
the government can prefer the economic security of citizens over aliens in
this context, the court correctly noted that this doctrine had been discredited
in Graham and rejected in the employment area in Dougall.214 In this
manner the Mow Sun Wong court recognized the alien's contribution to
United States society and implicitly concluded that these contributions
bear no less significance when it is the federal government, as opposed to
the state, which discriminates in the distribution of its resources. Second,
as in Dougall, it was argued that because civil service positions require
policy-making duties and involve issues of national security, the civil service
will function more smoothly if competitive positions are filled only with
citizens. The court precisely followed Dougall's reasoning, opining that
although some positions do involve policy-making and national security, this
fact is simply not justification for an automatic exclusion of aliens from all
competitive civil service.21 5 Thus, the discriminatory regulations were too
broad to serve their purpose and, while rational, they could not withstand
the compelling interest test.2 16 Further, it was again recognized that there
are many individual positions - those involving policy-making or national
security - for which non-citizens would not be suited. 217 What is pro-
hibited by the due process clause, as it is by the equal protection clause,
then, is the blanket prohibition of aliens, as a class, from any level of federal
employment.
Thus, it appears that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mow Sun Wong
was correct. Any "special power" the federal government has over aliens
213. It is not contended here that the Constitution dictates that the standard of
review under a fifth amendment analysis of federal government classifications must
parallel the judicial approach to discriminatory state legislation under the equal pro-
tection clause. However, it is submitted that the federal government should have no
greater power to discriminate, constitutionally or otherwise, than do the states in the
absence of special justifying circumstances.
214. F.2d at .. See notes 105-110 and accompanying text supra. The Mow
Sun Wong court also used a California Supreme Court case to support this conclusion.
See Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
See note 115 supra.
215. ____ F.2d ... The court noted that the majority of positions in the civil
service do not involve policy-making matters. Id.
216. Id. at It is to be noted that the named appellants in Mow Sun Wong
included a janitor, file clerk, clerk typist, and mail clerk. Id. at
217. Id. at .
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is limited primarily to the regulation of immigration, naturalization, and
deportation. In the area of government employment, the federal govern-
ment should stand on no different footing than the states. In analyzing
which interests a discriminatory statute might serve, federal-state distinc-
tions exist, but judicial analysis in either case should be directed toward
the question of whether the classification reflects a compelling governmental
interest and the necessity of the classification to effectuate that interest.
Generally, the similarities and distinctions between fourteenth amend-
ment protection against state discrimination and fifth amendment limits on
federal discrimination have never been set out definitively. If the Supreme
Court ultimately decides either the Mow Sun Wong or Jalil case, it will
have the opportunity to provide some clarification in this area. If the
Supreme Court were to review the Mow Sun Wong decision, two additional
issues might present difficulties. First, in utilizing the fifth amendment to
find an unjustifiable discrimination violative of due process, it generally
must be established that the classification deprives the complainant of life,
liberty, or property. In Bolling v. Sharpe,218 the Supreme Court took an
expansive view of "liberty" in finding that racial segregation in the District
of Columbia's public schools violated due process.219 It defined liberty as
"the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue .... "220
While it had been held that government employment was not "life, liberty
and property," 221 that conclusion was found to be of doubtful validity by
the Jalil court because of subsequent decisions holding that discharged
employees were entitled to some procedural due process protection.2 22 The
Mow Sun Wong court, citing its own precedent found that while there is
no "right" to public employment, "there is a constitutional right to be free
from unreasonably discriminatory practices with respect to such employ-
ment. '223 Further, several Supreme Court decisions imply that one of
the most basic of all liberties is the right of a person, alien or citizen, to be
free to secure employment, with equal opportunity, in order to supply his
family and himself with the necessities of life. 224 Therefore, it is safe to
conclude that a broad denial to the alien of the opportunity to work in the
218. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
219. Id. at 500.
220. Id. at 499.
221. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
222. 460 F.2d at 926 n.8. See, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
223. F.2d ..... quoting Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1969).
224. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1971); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) ; Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914). In Smith,
the Court stated:
Life, liberty and property and the equal protection of the laws, grouped to-
gether in the Constitution, are so related that the deprivation of any one of those
separate and independent rights may lessen or extinguish the value of the other
three. In so far as a man is deprived of the right to labor his liberty is restricted,
his capacity to earn wages and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied the
protection which the law affords those who are permitted to work.
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federal civil service is a denial of "liberty," well within the broad definition
set forth in Boiling v. Sharpe.
The second possible barrier to the upholding of Mow Sun Wong and
the application of the Dougall analysis to the discriminating aspects of the
federal civil service scheme is the longstanding tradition of according the
executive branch broad discretion in defining qualifications for government
employment, a point the Mow Sun Wong court unfortunately did not ad-
dress. In Bailey v. Richardson, 25 a former federal civil service employee
sought reinstatement after being discharged on grounds of disloyalty.226
The court of appeals, upholding the discharge, indicated that the "ability,
integrity and loyalty of purely executive employees is exclusively for the
executve branch .. . to determine .... ,,227 At first blush, it does appear
that a most fundamental internal function of a branch of government is the
selection of its employees, however, even the Bailey court recognized that
broad discrimination by Congress (and apparently also by the executive)
was not beyond judicial review.228 The appellant in Bailey argued that the
Supreme Court's decision in United Public Workers v. Mitchell 229 limited
the government's ability to prescribe qualifications for its employees.
230
The Mitchell court, in upholding a federal statute prohibiting federal em-
ployees from engaging in certain political activity while in the govern-
ment's employ, stated that qualifications for the public employment based
on race, religion, or political party preference were improper.2 8 ' The Bailey
court interpreted this to prohibit only "permanent, blanket proscription by
the Congress. ' 282 As Mow Sun Wong recognized, the federal civil service
regulations as they stand are precisely that - a "permanent blanket pro-
scription" against the employment of all aliens - and a strict standard of
review would, therefore, not necessarily be inconsistent with Bailey. It is
submitted that the executive's traditional latitude in powers of appoint-
ment, regulation, and removal of government employees should not be
controlling in the Mow Sun Wong context. In Dougall, the Court recog-
nized that the state had a strong interest in defining the "political com-
munity, '238 and in Griffiths it was recognized that, traditionally, the state
prescribed the qualifications of its attorneys.23 4 Nevertheless, in both cases,
the indiscriminate denial of employment opportunities was found to be
unjustifiable. For the Supreme Court now to hold that it is permissible for
the federal government to engage in such broad discrimination, while ex-
225. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
226. Id. at 49-50.
227. Id. at 51.
228. Id. at 63.
229. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
230. 182 F.2d at 62.
231. 330 U.S. at 100. Mitchell has been recently expressly reaffirmed. United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
232. 182 F.2d at 63.
233. 413 U.S. at 643.
234. 413 U.S. at 722-23.
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pressly prohibiting the same action by the states, would be anomalous, to
say the least. Certainly, as recognized in Mow Sun Wong, the spirit, if not
the precise legal analysis, of Dougall and Griffiths applies to the federal
government as well as to the states. The alternative to affirming M'ow Sun
Wong would be to permit the Congress simultaneously to allow an alien
to lawfully reside within the United States, and impose restrictions on him
which would seriously hamper his ability to live in this country. The
xenophobic effect of such a practice is obvious when one recalls the
Supreme Court's simple statement of almost 60 years ago: a man cannot
live where he cannot work.
2 5
Hopefully, the ultimate result of the Jalil-Mow Sun Wong litigation
will be the Supreme Court's declaration of the invalidity of the civil service
regulations as an impermissible discrimination violative of the fifth amend-
ment's due process guarantee .23 Presently, there are nearly three million
positions in the federal employment scheme, 2 7 and among them are many
positions appropriate for resident aliens to fill. In addition, it is hoped that
any Supreme Court decision will limit the federal government's ability to
unjustifiably discriminate to the same extent as the states have been limited
through the equal protection clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions in Dougall and Griffiths represent no
abrupt change in the law, but rather a culmination of over two decades
of developments in the Court's analysis of aliens' equal protection claims.
Previously, the alien had to show the invalidity of a statute by attempting
to demonstrate that it was without a rational basis which was presumed
to exist. The categorization of alienage as a "suspect class" truly has
placed the shoe on the other foot: not only may the state no longer rely
upon a presumption of the constitutionality of its legislation, it must also
bear a heavy burden in justifying distinctions between citizens and non-
citizens. This development in equal protection has the immediate result
of invalidating a plethora of discriminatory state statutes in the employment
area, and, as there are approximately four million resident aliens now
within the United States 28 proves to be of both practical and analytical
significance.
Of course, finding an equal protection violation requires an element of
"state action" and the judicial decisions examined in this Comment do not
affect discrimination in employment against the alien by the private em-
235. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
236. It is also quite possible that the result in Jalil and Mow Sun Wong will be
that the Civil Service Commission has no statutory authority to promulgate a regula-
tion conditioning employment on the holding of citizenship, since the applicable statutes
and executive order do not expressly authorize such an exercise of power. See note
176 supra. In that case, there will be no need to decide the constitutional issues
raised. See 460 F.2d at 931 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
237. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POCKET DATA BooK 95
(1971).
238. Id. at 75.
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ployer. A federal statute mandating equal employment opportunities in
the private sector 239 has been construed not to include refusals to hire non-
citizens because of that status, 240 and it is obvious that the equal protection
clause cannot obliterate all traces of discrimination. However, the spirit
of Dougall and Grifiths easily could be incorporated into federal legislation
designed to combat discrimination against aliens by the individual employer.
At present, however, the proper course for an alien victimized by private
discrimination is to bring an action under the Federal Civil Rights Act
of 1870 which guarantees to "all persons," equal rights under the law.
241
As far as the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is concerned, the two cases, Dougall and Griffiths, rightfully recognize and
declare the alien to be no less competent than the citizen to fill a state
position for which he is otherwise qualified. In the event of an outbreak
of armed hostilities or heightened world tensions, different considerations
may arise, with respect to residing "alien enemies," sufficient to meet the
compelling interest standard.2 42 The decisions recognize that in the absence
of that contingency, however, the alien, like any other person, must make
a living to support his family, and that only when the nature of a particular
position directly involves sensitive state or national interests such as the
formulation of governmental policy or problems of national security, is it
appropriate to exclude him. It is hoped that the Court, as it did in Dougall
and Griffiths, will continue to guard against legislation which utilizes over-
broad methods to "protect" government interest. It is suggested that, as
the federal government has no greater right to discriminate against the
alien in employment than do the states, the Supreme Court will eventually
hold federal legislative restrictions also violative of due process.
Douglas Paul Cdopersrnith
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). This statute makes it unlawful for an
employer to refuse to hire an individual because of the individual's national origin.
240. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., --- U.S ___. (1973). This case held that the
proscription of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970) did not include discrimination on
the basis of lack of citizenship.
241. 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1970) provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have . . . the full and equal benefits of all laws . . . ." In
Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972), the court
held that the term "all persons" included aliens, and that even absent state action, suit
was maintainable to enjoin an employer's discriminatory practices. Id. at 536, 538.
242. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.11 (1973).
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